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Abstract 
This article assesses the extent to which historical levels of inequality affect the creation and 
survival of businesses over time. To this end, we use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) survey across 66 countries over 2005–2011. We complement this survey with data 
on income inequality dating back to early 1800s and current institutional environment, such 
as the number of procedures to start a new business, countries’ degree of financial inclusion, 
corruption and political stability. We find that although inequality increases the number of 
firms created out of need, inequality reduces entrepreneurial activity as in net terms 
businesses are less likely to be created and survive over time. These findings are robust to 
using different measures of inequality across different points in time and regions, even if 
excluding Latin America the most unequal region in the world. Our evidence then supports 
theories that argue early conditions, crucially inequality, influence development path. 
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The old debate on whether inequality affects long-run development has received renewed 
attention, particularly since inequality has been rising in recent decades (Piketty, 2015). A 
substantial theoretical literature has, in turn, analysed whether inequality has any long-lasting 
effects particularly on entrepreneurial activities. Entrepreneurship has long been argued to be 
one of the main contributors to economic development given its role in job creation, 
introducing technological innovation, increasing value added and per capita incomes over time 
(Audretsch et al., 2006; Baumol et al., 2007; Schumpeter, 1943). In this respect, some studies 
have argued that higher inequality can have a detrimental effect on entrepreneurship if a large 
proportion of individuals are prevented from taking up profitable investments. It is argued that 
this negative and long-lasting effect gets exacerbated whenever accompanied by credit market 
imperfections (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Ghatak and Jiang, 2002). There are other studies 
that instead predict inequality has a positive effect on entrepreneurship. For instance, if the 
investments made by wealthy people increases the funds available in the economy, the poor 
then could benefit from the so-called “trickle-down” effect (Aghion and Bolton, 1997). The 
literature has also pointed out the possibility that inequality could well have null effects, for 
instance whenever the volatility of returns to occupations outweighs the role that wealth 
distribution might play (Champernowne, 1953).  
The ambiguity of the theoretical predictions is reflected in the very mixed findings of 
the empirical literature. Some studies suggest that inequality has either a positive or a negative 
effect on economic growth, whilst others finding no effect at all (Bénabu, 1996; Cingano, 2014; 
De Dominicis et al., 2006; Voitchovsky, 2009). Empirical studies looking more specifically at 
the impact of inequality on entrepreneurial rates are scant. Although there are some 
international cross-country studies, these efforts have primarily provided simple correlations 
without testing (and correcting) for the likely presence of endogeneity between inequality and 
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entrepreneurial rates. The lack of robust evidence thus limits our understanding of the effects 
that inequality might have (Lecuna, 2014; Lippman et al., 2005; Reynolds et al., 2005). 
The objective of this article is to empirically test whether income inequality has a long-
term effect on entrepreneurship. Specifically, the article offers two contributions. First, unlike 
much of previous empirical studies, we directly test whether income inequality that prevailed 
in the distant past, dating back to early 1800s, has any effect on contemporaneous 
entrepreneurial activity across 66 countries over 2005–2011. Since inequality might have a 
non-linear effect over time, we use different inequality measures, and over different periods 
(1820, 1910 and 1980). This approach allows us to overcome some of the issues pointed out 
by Piketty and Saez (2006), who argue that in order to understand the causes and consequences 
of changes in income and wealth distribution one needs to put them in a broad historical 
perspective. Second, we assess the impact that inequality has broadly on different stages of 
entrepreneurship by analysing: start-ups, established businesses, as well as those businesses 
that were opened out of need. By separately studying the association between historical 
inequality and these different entrepreneurial activities, we are able to provide a broader picture 
as to how inequality might affect the creation and survival of businesses.  For instance, previous 
studies have shown that Latin America, the most unequal region in the world, has a positive 
correlation between contemporaneous indicators of income inequality and the number of 
enterprises being created. However, many of these enterprises do not survive over time given 
that some of these businesses were opened out of need (as people had no other job options, or 
due to the poor economic conditions of the country). Hence, it is important to analyse the 
impact that inequality has on the number of established enterprises and on those that were 
created for reasons other than seeking-pure profits. 
To study the relationship between inequality and entrepreneurship we use the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey. GEM is the largest survey of entrepreneurial activity 
4 
 
around the globe, drawing nationally representative surveys on entrepreneurial activity on an 
annual basis. We complement this survey with historical estimates of income distribution 
ranging from the 19th century until the 20th century as estimated by Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002). In addition to past inequality indicators, we also consider contemporaneous 
institutional factors that could affect the creation and maturity of firms according to the 
literature. These refer to a number of procedures to start a new business, access to formal credit 
and indicators of good governance such as the degree of country’s political stability and control 
of corruption (La Porta et al., 1998; Naudé, 2008; Perotti, 1996). In contrast to previous similar 
studies, we address for the likely endogeneity that might be present when considering the 
impact of these institutional variables on entrepreneurship (e.g. Alvarez and Urbano, 2011; 
Lecuna, 2014).  We do so given that these institutional variables could be endogenously 
determined by the proportion of people involved in entrepreneurial activities who, for instance, 
may lobby for lower business start costs, more financial access, better governance, etc. To this 
end, we use instrumental variables (IV), a method commonly to deal with endogeneity.2  
                                                             
2 As instruments, we include those shown in previous literature to be strongly correlated with the 
institutional variables considered. Thus, number of procedures to start a new business, control of 
corruption and  political stability are instrumented with the colonial origin of the country and the 
European settler mortality rate (Acemoglu et al., 2001) and the number of journalist killed by country 
(Besley and Burgess, 2001; Besley and Prat, 2006; Chowdhury, 2004). We also instrument financial 
inclusion with the fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people (Beck et al., 2007) and other indicators 
found in the literature as associated with the biological responses that people suffer due to experiencing 
financial hardship such as high systolic blood pressure (O’Neil et al., 2005) and high cholesterol levels, 
both indicators aggregated at country level (Ezzati et al., 2005). The various robustness tests confirm 
that all instruments are jointly correlated with the endogenous variables and to be valid instruments. 
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 Several articles before ours have found quite mixed evidence on the impact that 
inequality has on development, and specifically on entrepreneurship. Our findings help 
reconcile and understand this previous mixed evidence. On the one hand, we find countries that 
started with high levels of inequality in the early 1800s currently are more likely to have a 
higher number of enterprises created out of need. However, in net terms inequality overall has 
a detrimental effect on net entrepreneurial activity in both start-ups and established businesses 
(those businesses that have survived over 3.5 years), even when considering current business 
and institutional environment. This detrimental effect is consistent if analysing different 
inequality measures, across different points in time, and if analysing the entire 66 countries 
together, considering only the Global South (Africa, Asia and Latin America), or excluding 
Latin America. Our results are also robust if using instrumental variables. 
 We also find a strong association between the historical inequality indicators used and 
the contemporaneous differences in access to credit markets between the rich and poor. These 
findings give support to the common assumption in the theoretical literature that suggests 
income inequality reflects the severity of credit constraints people face (Ljungqvist, 1993). This 
evidence also gives evidence to the extent that inequality in the distant past has prevented the 
poorest and credit-constrained people investing in profitable activities, thereby reinforcing 
inequality patterns and dampening entrepreneurial activities over time (Banerjee and Newman, 
1993). 
Our results thus challenge those studies that argue entrepreneurship can be a ladder 
through which social mobility can take place given that the enterprises that get opened out of 
need are unlikely to survive in the long- or even medium-term (Solimano, 2014). Overall our 
results support theories that recommend wealth-distribution efforts and improved financial 
inclusion as means to foster entrepreneurship and development. If no such public interventions 
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are taken, entrepreneurial activities in highly unequal countries are unlikely to render a 
sustainable channel to bridge development gaps.  
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
inequality and entrepreneurship. Section 3 describes the datasets used and methodology used. 
Section 4 presents the baseline results, whilst Section 5 offers robustness checks. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Impact of inequality on entrepreneurship 
The impact that inequality might have on development has been greatly debated in the 
literature. In this section, we briefly discuss some of the most prominent views, focusing on 
the alleged role that inequality might have for entrepreneurial activity in the long-run. 
 
2.1 Does inequality deter entrepreneurial activity? 
One view within the theoretical literature is that initial conditions can have long-term 
consequences for development, particularly if starting from high levels of wealth/income 
inequality. Inequality could affect development through different channels. For instance by 
leading to inefficient institutions (Glaeser et al., 2003), political instability (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996, Bénabu, 1996), affecting the size, composition of domestic demand and level of 
industrialization (Jaramillo, 1995; Murphy et al., 1989) and preventing individuals from taking 
up profitable investments in capital (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Banerjee and Newman, 1993) 
or human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2004).  
For instance, high levels of inequality could lead to political pressure to set up 
inefficient levels of taxation thereby hindering growth (Perotti, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 
1994). This could be as in Alesina and Rodrick (1994) who argue high levels of inequality 
could lead to the majority of people voting for high capital taxes. These high taxes reduce the 
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incentives to accumulate capital thereby reducing growth. The damaging effect of inequality 
on growth could also be reached if wealthier individuals lobby against policies that seek to 
redistribute wealth and foster a more inclusive growth path (Bénabu, 1996). 
Other scholars have argued that early wealth distribution determines whether a country 
industrializes by affecting market size (Murphy et al., 1989), the adoption of modern 
production technologies, productivity, and the number of workers employed in the modern 
sector (Jaramillo, 1995). Similarly, others argue that differences in wealth, particularly under 
the presence of imperfect credit markets, can be detrimental to growth. For instance, Banerjee 
and Newman (1993) assume in an overlapping generations model that each agent can choose 
to become a wage-earner or an entrepreneur which requires a larger up-front investment than 
the one required to become a self-employed.  These up-front investments can be financed from 
would-be entrepreneurs’ own wealth or by requesting a loan. However, due to the possibility 
that people could renege on their debts, lenders will be willing to loan only to those that can 
put in place collateral. Thus, people who do not have enough wealth to provide such collateral 
will be credit-constrained and be destined to be workers or unemployed. More importantly, 
the initial distribution of wealth in this model, in particular, the ratio of credit to non-credit 
constrained, determines who can invest, occupational returns, bequests and endowments 
across generations. Countries with low inequality -in the sense of having a high proportion of 
non-credit constrained people- will grow over time by having a large share of the population 
being able to establish businesses that survive over time paying high salaries. A contrasting 
equilibrium, however, could be reached if a country starts with high levels of inequality in the 
sense of having a small proportion of non-credit constrained people and very large proportion 
of credit constrained people. In this case, in the long-run, there will be a very large number of 
poor wage-earners and a small number of entrepreneurs.  
8 
 
In terms of empirical evidence, the extensive literature review of Bénabu (1996) shows 
that although most studies find a negative association between inequality and economic 
growth, still there is no consensus. A more recent review by De Dominicis et al. (2006) 
coincides that older studies using data for the mid-1990s and before show a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth. Nonetheless, most recent empirical studies have 
tended to find a positive relationship instead. Voitchovsky (2009) reports in another literature 
review that despite several studies finding high inequality associated with lower growth rate, 
still no consensus has been reached. She argues that the mixed results might obey as high 
inequality at the bottom of the distribution hinders growth, but high inequality at the top is 
associated with higher growth rate.  
With regards to the effect on entrepreneurship, Quadrini (1999) using the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics in the USA for the 1980s finds that only those with sufficient personal 
wealth can start up a business since relying on external funds alone is insufficient. Similarly, 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) in a study from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men 
in the USA find evidence that would-be entrepreneurs must bear most of the risk from their 
ventures. As a result, wealthier people are most likely to become entrepreneurs, evidence that 
agrees with other recent studies (Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2012). Although some find that 
liquidity constraints deter self-employment for poorer households (Gentry and Hubbard, 2004; 
Zissimopolos et al., 2009), others find no evidence of a necessary binding liquidity constraint 
(Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). As Frid et al. (2016) argue, this mixed evidence might be explained 
by two factors. First, the empirical literature has typically not considered the initial wealth of 
the household, prior to becoming an entrepreneur. Second, empirical studies often focus on 
only people that have businesses already established, omitting assessing start-ups. To 
overcome these limitations, Fried et al. (2016) use the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial 
Dynamics II from 1214 nascent entrepreneurs in the USA. They find that initial wealth of the 
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entrepreneur, does not constrain start-ups, but it is an important determinant of entrepreneurial 
success. In similar fashion, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), using data from individual income tax 
returns of people who received inheritances, find that liquidity constraints are an important 
deterrent to engaging in entrepreneurial activities and for entrepreneurs to survive and grow in 
the medium to long-run.  
Evidence from developing countries suggests that despite start-up costs for small 
businesses being significantly low, there is still evidence to support liquidity constraints. For 
instance, Mesnard and Ravallion (2001) find the number of business start-ups in Tunisia is an 
increasing function of aggregate wealth, where higher the wealth inequalities produce lower 
overall rates of new business start-ups. The evidence on this later point is nonetheless 
inconclusive. For instance, other studies have found a positive association between moderate 
levels of inequality and entrepreneurship, thus suggesting that inequality might also encourage 
business participation, particularly in developing countries (Rapoport, 2002; Naudé, 2008).  
 
2.2 Does inequality foster entrepreneurial activity? 
Other studies have instead argued for the positive role that inequality might have on 
entrepreneurial activity. Within this view, references to self-made millionaires and offspring 
of working class or migrants that became successful business owners are put as clear examples 
that lacking access to financial markets or having limited wealth are not necessarily a binding 
constraint. The critics of the importance of liquidity constraints for nascent entrepreneurship 
are not oblivious that the survival of business might depend not only on the ability of the 
entrepreneur but also on access to financial resources to survive (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). 
Nonetheless, sociologists such as Aldrich (1999) suggest that economic models tend to put too 
much emphasis on the importance that income might play for nascent entrepreneurship. 
Besides, even within the economic literature, there are scholars that suggest wide differences 
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in returns to capital or education might actually provide incentives for people to work harder 
to try to take up profitable investments (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). If people are able 
to take these investments, then these cases could represent important source mobility for 
current and future generations (Keister, 2000; Lippmann et al., 2005). Thus, past inequality 
might not necessarily be a deterrent for entrepreneurial activity nor a determinant for future 
inequality. 
For instance, Lippman et al. (2005) using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), 
the same survey used in this article, find that inequality has a positive effect on overall 
entrepreneurial activity. These authors argue that this positive finding is perhaps given that 
those in the top of the distribution have enough financial resources to set up their business and 
those at the bottom some might become self-employed rather than earning low wages. 
Similarly, Lecuna (2014) finds that the Gini coefficient has a positive effect on the Total Early-
Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) as measured by the GEM survey using data from 54 
countries over 2005–2009. This result is robust if the entry density is derived from the World 
Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshot.   
Given the ambiguous impact that inequality and wealth constraints might have on 
entrepreneurship, some empirical studies have distinguished those businesses that were opened 
out of need, and those seeking an opportunity in the market (Reynolds et al., 2005). For 
instance, Lippmann et al. (2005) use the GEM survey to find that inequality has a positive 
association with the entrepreneurial activity initiated out of need. Similarly, inequality is 
positively associated with the total entrepreneurial activity that is initiated to seize a business 
opportunity; however, this positive relationship was found up to a point, only for countries with 
a Gini coefficient of 45 or less. Beyond that level, this relationship becomes negative, which 
was the case for Latin American countries such as Mexico, Chile and Brazil. In these cases, 
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the high levels of inequality are negatively associated with the entrepreneurial activity that was 
initiated to seize market opportunities.  
In line with the discussed literature, this article seeks to test the following two 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Historical levels of inequality are negatively associated with the net 
entrepreneurial activity (in terms of start-up and the established firms) over time. 
Hypothesis 2: Historical levels of inequality are positively associated with higher levels 
of entrepreneurial activity for start-ups opened out of need. Since these start-ups are unlikely 
to survive, inequality is likely to have null effects on those established firms that were 
originally opened out of need.  
To prevent the likely endogenous relationship between inequality and entrepreneurial 
activity, unlike much of similar previous empirical literature, we use historical estimators of 
income inequality for the distant past, dating back to early 1800s. This approach also allows us 
to more directly test the predictions of the theoretical literature that argues initial conditions 
influence the accumulation of wealth across generations, thereby affecting entrepreneurship 
activity over time. Moreover, to assess whether the impact of inequality remains strong over 
time, we also use other inequality indicators across different points in time.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Historical Statistics  
The theoretical literature has highlighted that credit market imperfections exacerbate the 
detrimental impact that inequality may have on investments and output over time (Aghion et 
al., 1999; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). It is argued that if a large 
percentage of the population is credit-constrained, they and their offspring, in turn, will be 
unable to take up potentially profitable activities, thus, reducing the number of start ups and 
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investment in human capital. As a result, a country with such conditions will remain with low 
returns over time. To test these theoretical implications ideally we would need historical 
statistics on the percentage of people that might have been credit and non-credit constrained. 
Since there are no such historical statistics, we instead use the readily available historical 
estimators of income distribution across the globe dating back to early 1800s. Our implicit 
assumption is that these historical inequality measures are a good proxy for the historical ratio 
of people that were credit and non-credit constrained in the distant past. This assumption is 
based on contemporaneous evidence that suggests poorer people are often credit-constrained. 
That is the case as poor population lack enough wealth to provide collateral or live far from a 
banking institution, thus affecting their chances of obtaining credit (Baliamoune-Lutz et al., 
2011; Berg, 2013). Later on, in Section 5, as a robustness check, we show evidence that these 
historical inequality measures correlate well with current measures of credit availability for the 
wealthy and poor income groups. 
Specifically, we use Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) estimates of the world income 
distribution spanning from the 19th century until the 20th century. These authors were the first 
to provide a broad historical picture about the levels of global inequality.  This study provides 
income share by decile, which we use to build different inequality indicators ranging from the 
traditional Gini coefficient to different ratios of income shares across deciles.  
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) estimated the historical income distribution around 
the globe using several sources of historical GDP per capita and population.3 Since these 
                                                             
3 To estimate the distribution of income three main variables were used: the real GDP expressed in 
constant purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars; population size, and the distribution of income 
summarised by nine decile income shares, and the top two vintile shares. The sources of these indicators 
include the historical estimates of GDP per capita and population from Maddison (1995 cited by 
Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002, p. 729), those of Berry et al. (1983a, b, cited by Bourguignon and 
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historical indicators were not available for a few countries, these authors grouped a few 
countries to minimize problems of missing income distribution data.  The groupings were based 
on considerations of economic and historical consistency. In total, the authors estimated the 
income distribution for 33 countries or groups of countries. Those countries whose weight in 
the world is significant were considered individually, that is the case of China, India, Italy and 
the USA to mention a few. Others such as Sub-Saharan and Latin America were broken down 
into sub-groups according to their economic evolution and homogeneity. In Table A.1, in the 
Appendix, we include the list of individual countries and sub-groups and for which we have 
such estimators of income inequality.  
Given the use of historical data these income inequality indicators should be taken as 
suggestive of the levels and dynamics of historical income distribution and not necessarily at 
face value. Particularly, those related to the far distant past. For this reason, we also use the 
indicators by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) for a more recent period, including 1980s. 
These recent indicators provide a more reliable picture of the recent inequality levels. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the three measures of inequality we use 
across 66 countries at three points in time 1820, 1910 and 1980. Given the relative stability of 
inequality over time, we focus on estimating our regressions in the next section only using 
these years as inequality around other nearby years reaches same results as those presented.  
On average, inequality increased slightly from 1820 to 1910. That was the case if using 
the traditional Gini coefficient or the two other measures of inequality we constructed. That is 
                                                             
Morrisson 2002, p. 730) for the pre- and post-World War II period. More recent data for historical data, 
the USA and UK, for instance, were drawn from Lindert (2000 cited by Bourguignon and Morrisson 
2002, p. 730) and for continental Europe from Morrisson (2000 cited by Bourguignon and Morrisson 
2002, p. 730). To fill in the gaps in information, the authors in some cases also used growth rates 
observed for comparable neighbouring countries over the same period. 
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the ratio of income share of the top 9th decile to bottom decile, and the ratio of the income share 
of the top four deciles to that of the bottom four deciles. Moreover, inequality on average fell 
comparing 1980 to the levels of both 1820 and 1910.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics on historical inequality 
 
 
Despite the decline of inequality in the 20th century, countries that started from being 
highly unequal in 1820 remained so over time, and the ones that started more egalitarian also 
remained so over time. That is the case if measuring inequality with the Gini coefficient, as 
shown in Figure 1, Panel A, and with any other ratio of income share deciles. Figure 1, Panel 
B, for instance, shows the strong linear relationship between the ratio of the income share of 9 
decile to the bottom decile in 1820 and 1980. 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Inequality measures
Gini 1820 66 0.47 0.05 0.34 0.62
Gini 1910 66 0.49 0.04 0.34 0.62
Gini 1980 67 0.42 0.09 0.28 0.59
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1820 66 1.97 0.29 1.22 2.48
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1910 66 2.01 0.27 1.22 2.48
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1980 66 1.84 0.28 1.11 2.39
ln ratio top 4 deciles to bottom 4 deciles year 1820 66 1.72 0.26 1.15 2.48
ln ratio top 4 deciles to bottom 4 deciles year 1910 66 1.77 0.23 1.15 2.48




Figure 1. Inequality for years 1820 and 1980 
 
3.2 GEM Survey 
To assess the extent of entrepreneurial activity, ranging from creation to maturity of 
businesses, we use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey. The GEM survey is 
the largest study of entrepreneurial activity around the globe, which draws nationally 
representative samples on an annual basis across more than 80 countries.  
To study the dynamics of entrepreneurship, we consider the Early-Stage 
Entrepreneurial Rate (TEA) as defined by GEM. That is the percentage of the adult population 
in the process of setting up a business they will own or co-own, or that currently own, manage 
and operate a young business that is up to 3.5 years old (Reynolds et al., 2005). We also 
consider the percentage of the adult population that have established firms, understood as those 
who own, manage a firm and that have paid salaries or wages to the owners or workers for 
more than 3.5 years. These two indicators reveal not only the number of firms that are created 
in each country, but also importantly how many of these survive over time. 
For our analysis, we focus on the 66 countries surveyed in GEM that were at least 
surveyed in one year during the period 2005–2011 and for which we have also historic 
information on income distribution. The countries analysed are listed in Table A.2, whereas 
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Table A.3 provides a description of the variables used and data sources.4 In our period of 
analysis, on average 9.6% owned a young firm, and 7.6% had an established firm as shown in 
Table 2. Crucial for our study is to test whether these contemporaneous indicators of 
entrepreneurial activity are associated with the levels of income inequality prevailing in the 
distant past. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
 
Figure 2, Panel A, illustrates the negative association found between the average 
percentage of the population that was engaged in early entrepreneurial activity (TEA) during 
2005–2011 and the 1820 ratio of the income share of the 9th decile to the bottom decile, one 
of our indicators of inequality. This negative relationship is also evident in Panel B. That plot 
depicts the relationship between the inequality ratio for 1820 and the percentage of the adult 
population that own and manage an established firm during 2005–2011.  
                                                             
4 In total, 1,526,407 people across 89 countries were interviewed by GEM over 2005–2011. From these, 
we discard the responses from 23 sampled countries as we have no historical statistics on inequality for 
these cases. Thus we remain with 889,863 respondents across 66 countries. 
Average 
2005-2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
% Young firms (TEA) 0.096 0.075 0.088 0.083 0.096 0.099 0.109 0.110
%Established firms 0.076 0.065 0.069 0.064 0.086 0.079 0.087 0.071
%Personally knows someone who started a 
business 2 years ago 0.417 0.419 0.424 0.435 0.440 0.445 0.417 0.350
Number of selected countries in GEM surveys 66 33 39 36 44 41 48 50
Number of respondents in GEM surveys 889,863 105,638 153,989 136,819 113,715 130,259 127,973 121,470
Access to credit (%GDP) 108.1 134.4 115.1 115.9 106.2 100.2 100.6 96.3
Number of procedures starting a business 7.556 6.333 7.000 7.324 7.639 8.340 8.060 7.522
Political stability 0.186 0.547 0.246 0.268 0.112 -0.006 0.108 0.183
Control of corruption 0.532 1.115 0.803 0.758 0.134 0.309 0.413 0.491
GNI per capita in 2000 17509.6 21789.7 19614.2 19818.8 15659.5 16123.6 14977.3 16773.5
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Figure 2 suggests that countries that in the distant past had a higher level of income gap 
between the wealthy and poor over time developed a lower rate of entrepreneurial activity. This 
simple linear relationship, however, excludes various other factors that affect entrepreneurial 
activity. Thus, our econometric assessment presented in the following sections also control for 
other indicators, apart from inequality.  
 
Figure 2. Percentage of total early-state entrepreneurial activity (TEA) and established firms 
over 2005-2011 and the ratio of the income share top 9 decile to the bottom decile for year 
1820 
 
Following the literature on entrepreneurship, we also consider the percentage of the 
adult population who personally know someone who started a new business during the last 
two years, data drawn from the GEM survey. The presence of ‘entrepreneurial roles’ has been 
found in previous studies to strongly influence the creation of firms (Ardanga and Lusardi, 
2008). We also add education as it has been identified as an important factor in accessing 
information and identifying business opportunities that might aid in the creation and 
management of firms (Naudé, 2010; Ordeñana and Arteaga, 2012). Our indicator is 
specifically the percentage of the adult population that has post-secondary education or higher 




3.3 Current institutional and business environment 
We also control for the impact that current credit market and institutions might have on 
entrepreneurial activity, adding four other indicators. To measure the availability of credit, we 
use the domestic credit provided by the banking sector from the World Bank, which includes 
all credit to the various sectors, as the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from 
2005 until 2011. To proxy for other institutional costs that might impede the creation of firms, 
we control for the number of procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start 
up and formally operate a business based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business from 
2005 until 2011. We also consider other institutional aspects that might deter the creation and 
maturity of firms. These are as follows: political stability and control of corruption, both 
obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) projects from 2005 until 2011 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). These two variables range from -2.5 to 2.5, with the higher the score 
denoting better institutions.5  
Finally, we also use the Gross National Income (GNI) at purchasing power parity. We 
use this statistic to take into account the current level of economic development, a key factor 
found in previous literature to explain the level of entrepreneurial activity (Alvarez and Urbano 
2011; Wennekers et al., 2005). To avoid a potential endogenous relationship between the GNI 
per capita and the number of firms, we use the value of GNI of the year 2000 exclusively.  
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for our key aggregate indicators for the whole 
sample on average for 2005–2011 and for each of these years. 
 
                                                             
5 Political stability measures the probability that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Control of 
corruption measures the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
as well as the capture of the state by elites and private interests. 
19 
 
3.3 Panel random effects 
We use panel random effects to measure the extent to which historical measures of inequality, 
our proxy for past access to credit, affects entrepreneurial activities over time using the GEM 
survey. Since GEM draws new nationally representative samples each year, the surveys remain 
representative of the population engaged in entrepreneurial activities over time, avoiding an 
attrition bias commonly found in firm’s surveys.  Equation (1) denotes the panel random effects 
regression we estimate. 
                
                   yit=α+1 Historical inequality+2 xit+3 Xi +4 Regioni +5 Yeart + it                (1) 
where yit denotes the percentage of the adult population engaged in entrepreneurial activity  in 
country i and time t.  xit represents the vector of our explanatory variables that change over 
time. X are time invariant country’s covariates. Region is a set of dummy variables (for Africa, 
Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, Oceania and the Middle East) to take into 
account time-invariant characteristics, such as geography or other time-invariant institutional 
factors. Year denotes year fixed effects that allow us to take into account changes in economic 
activity over the period analysed. it refers to the random error. Our coefficient of interest 1 
tests whether the entrepreneurial activity over the period analysed, 2005–2011, depends on the 
level of inequality that countries had in the distant past. To interpret this coefficient as 
elasticity, we measure both entrepreneurial activity and the historical inequality indicators in 
natural logarithm.  
We estimate all the panel regressions using country random effects given the versatility 
of this type of specification. Specifically, the random effects model allows us to test the impact 
of two types of covariates: for those for which we do not have yearly data (such as our historical 
measure of inequality) and those time variant (as many of our institutional controls that vary 
on a yearly basis). The random effects model is commonly used whenever having time-
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invariant explanatory variables (e.g. our historical measure of inequality) that are of great 
theoretical importance to test as the effects of this type of variables are impossible to measure 
in panel fixed effects model (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, p. 251).  The random effects 
model yields unbiased and efficient estimates provided that there is no (or little) covariance 
between the error term and the explanatory variables, as we show that is our case in section 5. 
Moreover, the Hausman’s specification tests suggest we should adopt the random specification 
as yields consistent and more efficient estimates than the fixed effects specification.6  
 
4. Econometric Results 
4.1 To what extent historical inequality affects contemporaneous entrepreneurial activity? 
Table 3 reports the panel random country effects regression of the log of entrepreneurial 
activity on historical inequality using robust standard errors across all models. Columns (1) to 
(4) focus on the log of the percentage of people engaged in early entrepreneurial activity (TEA). 
Columns (5) to (8) instead focus on the log of the percentage of people engaged in established 
business. As a measure of historical inequality, we use the log of the ratio of the income share 
of the top 9th decile and the bottom decile. We separately test the effects of this indicator if 
measured for the year 1820, 1910 and 1980.  
                                                             
6  We have unbalanced panel regression given that the countries analysed do not appear across every 
single year analysed. The Hausman test when using the log of TEA as our dependent variable is equal 
to χ2=10.18 with a probability> χ2=0.6002, which accepts the null hypothesis that states the random 
effects and fixed effects are both consistent, but fixed effects is inefficient; thus the random specification 
should be preferred. Similarly, the Hausman test when using the log of the percentage of the population 




Confirming our first hypothesis, all models estimated show there is a strong and 
statistically significant negative correlation between the measures of historical inequality and 
entrepreneurial activity conducted over 2005–2011. That is, the larger the income share held 
by the wealthy relative to the poor the lower the share of people involved in young or 
established firms. For instance, a 1% increase in the historic ratio of wealthy to poor reduces 
the proportion of people involved in young firms by around 4% and the proportion of people 
involved in established firms by 6% in established firms. These effects are quite similar for the 
historical measures of inequality of 1820, 1910 and 1980, albeit higher for more recent 
indicators, suggesting that the detrimental impact of inequality increases over time. These 
results are also consistent if controlling for current credit and institutional factors or not, as 
seen in columns (1) and (5). Interestingly, the level of entrepreneurial activity is not 
significantly affected by the contemporaneous access to credit or by the level of GNI per capita 
in 2000. We also explored whether the absolute level of GNI in the distant past (in 1820) 
affected current entrepreneurial activity, finding no effect thus the results are not shown in the 
table. These findings suggest that current entrepreneurial activity is more strongly dependent 
of past income distribution (our proxy for how credit was distributed among the poor and rich) 









Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To assess the robustness of these findings, we also consider different measures of 
historical inequality. For instance, Table A.4 shows the log of the ratio of the income share of 
the top four deciles to the bottom four deciles, and the traditional Gini coefficient.7 For these 
two measures of inequality, we also find a strong and statistically significant negative 
correlation with entrepreneurial activity.  
The consistency of the findings with alternative inequality measures across different 
historical points is reassuring. Particularly so given that it is unclear what specific period should 
be taken as a relevant starting point to assess the historical impact of inequality over time. For 
instance, one could argue that the income distribution in the year 1820 might be more relevant 
for Latin America, as back then colonising institutions had been implemented, resulting in high 
                                                             
7 We present these only for the year 1820 only as the results for year 1910 and 1980 also remain similar 
in statistical significance and sign. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lntea Lntea Lntea Lntea Lnestablished Lnestablished Lnestablished Lnestablished
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1820 -0.322** -0.391** -0.583* -0.687*
(0.162) (0.161) (0.323) (0.357)
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1910 -0.419** -0.739*
(0.172) (0.396)
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1980 -0.478** -0.674*
(0.225) (0.344)
Political stability -0.160* -0.159* -0.215*** -0.061 -0.060 -0.122
(0.089) (0.090) (0.082) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113)
Control corruption 0.040 0.044 0.024 -0.034 -0.029 -0.047
(0.084) (0.085) (0.071) (0.137) (0.138) (0.130)
Number procedure start business 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.018 0.017 0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Access to credit 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GNI per capita 2000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%Personally knows someone who started 
a business 2 years ago 1.605*** 1.518*** 1.532*** 1.520*** 0.479 0.822** 0.839** 0.829**
(0.253) (0.304) (0.303) (0.305) (0.329) (0.393) (0.390) (0.412)
% Post-secondary education 0.165 0.521** 0.506** 0.527** -0.022 0.187 0.169 0.195
(0.200) (0.239) (0.238) (0.236) (0.215) (0.266) (0.264) (0.256)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 270 217 217 216 270 217 217 216
Number of countries 64 52 52 51 64 52 52 51
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levels of inequality.8 Similarly, 1820 might also be quite relevant for Europe as this period 
witnessed the transition to new manufacturing processes that lead to the industrial revolution. 
Thus, the income distribution back then provided crucial to decide how many people could set 
up businesses or become wage-earners. Although one could argue that perhaps the most 
relevant starting point for Africa is closer to 1920 given that by then much of the continent had 
been colonised by European powers, one should also consider that pre-colonial institutions 
have been linked to the slow development of the region (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 
2011). Regardless of what initial point might be regarded as more relevant for Africa, the 
inequality distribution for the continent had very little changes from 1820 to 1910, and 
afterward. The lack of significant changes might well be because many pre-colonial local elites 
were used by colonisers to implement their rule, preserving their preferential status. The small 
tax-redistributive nature of independent African governments also explain the low investment 
in public goods in the region (Acemoglu and Robinso, 2010). 
With regard to the controls used, we find that political stability also has a strong and 
negative association with entrepreneurial activity, but only for young firms, as shown in Table 
3. There is not much evidence that our measures of the number of procedures required to start 
a business, control of corruption or domestic credit affect the creation of firms. In general, the 
findings of political stability and lack of effect on our measure of credit markets coincides with 
those of Alvarez and Urbano (2011) who also used these indicators to explore the association 
between these variables and  entrepreneurial activities for young firms using the GEM survey.  
We also find education has a positive effect for early-stage entrepreneurial activity, but 
no effect on established firms. This mixed evidence has also been found in other studies. For 
                                                             
8 Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) stress that the colonial institutions in the region perpetuated unequal 
opportunities given the low taxes for the wealthy and low public investment in education, and 
infrastructure conducive to (inclusive) growth. 
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instance, those that find a positive correlation between education and entrepreneurial activity 
argue that education helps people identify business opportunities, and as such, higher education 
levels produce higher engagement in new business opportunities (Simón-Moya et al., 2014). 
However, for running established business entrepreneurial-specific knowledge and previous 
business experience is more relevant than simply having higher a level of education attainment 
(Man et al., 2002).  
The estimated coefficient of knowing someone who started a business two years ago is 
positive and statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the existing literature on 
entrepreneurial role models (Krueger, 1993; Shapero and Sokol, 1982). We also find a negative 
(albeit quite weak) and statistically significant relationship between the GNI per capita for 
2000, which we use as a baseline for development level, and entrepreneurial activity, 
particularly in young firms. This negative association has also been found in previous studies 
(Alvarez and Urbano 2011; Reynolds et al., 2001).9 A potential explanation for this finding is 
that as countries develop, the percentage of people who needs to open a business out of need 
decreases. 
  
4.2 Does historical inequality fosters out of need entrepreneurship? 
We re-run our analysis to test our second hypothesis. However, this time we focus only on the 
percentage of people who stated in GEM survey opened their business out of need as ‘there 
were no better choices for work’. Roughly a third of entrepreneurs engaged in young firms and 
in established firms stated that out of need was the reason they engaged in their current 
business. As expected, Table 4 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship 
                                                             
9 We also find this weak negative relationship if using instead the absolute level of GNI in the distant 
past (in 1820). These results are not presented as the regression coefficients are nearly equal to zero.   
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between our historical measure of inequality and the percentage of people involved in these 
young firms. That is, as expected, the higher income shares of the wealthy relative to the poor 
produce higher shares of people that will open firms out of need. There is however mixed 
evidence about this relationship for established firms (firms that have survived for longer than 
3.5 years). As column (4) shows, this relationship with inequality is positive, but are no longer 
statistically significant in columns (5) and (6). These findings suggest that although more 
unequal countries have a higher probability of people opening firms out of need, these might 
not survive in the short and medium-run; thus, our lack of association between inequality and 
established firms opened out of need. Overall, these findings are consistent with the high 
entrepreneurial activity of young firms noted in highly unequal developing countries, where 
















Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5. Robustness checks 
We conclude our analysis with three robustness checks to assess the validity and consistency 
of the results presented so far. First, in Table 5, we re-run the panel country random effects, 
but this time excluding Latin American countries, known for being the most unequal in the 
world historically. Once again, we find a strong and negative association between 




Table 5. Entrepreneurial activity during 2005-2011 and historical inequality excluding Latin 
America, panel random effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lntea Lntea Lntea Lnestablished Lnestablished Lnestablished
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1820 0.574** 0.163*
(0.229) (0.095)
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1910 0.437* 0.116
(0.248) (0.088)
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1980 0.484** -0.024
(0.244) (0.151)
Political stability -0.012 -0.016 0.020 0.041 0.039 0.029
(0.098) (0.098) (0.104) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058)
Control corruption -0.172 -0.192 -0.203 -0.078 -0.085* -0.099*
(0.132) (0.132) (0.131) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054)
Number procedure start business -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.015** 0.014* 0.012*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Access to credit -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GNI per capita 2000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%Personally knows someone who started 
a business 2 years ago 0.273 0.234 0.247 -0.132 -0.149 -0.169
(0.556) (0.564) (0.556) (0.296) (0.293) (0.304)
% Post-secondary education -0.517 -0.490 -0.488 0.042 0.053 0.057
(0.337) (0.331) (0.325) (0.206) (0.208) (0.208)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 217 217 216 217 217 216




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We do not re-run this analysis exclusively for Latin America given that we have 
historical indicators of inequality for very few countries in this region. Nonetheless, in Table 
6, we restrict our analysis to only countries in the Global South; namely Africa, Latin America 
and Asia. Once again, we find a negative relationship between historical inequality and 
entrepreneurial activity, but higher than the one found for the full sample. Also, the regression 
coefficient for the inequality measure of 1820 is almost identical with the one in 1910 (the 
difference is tiny if show regression coefficients at the three decimal level). This is perhaps not 
surprising. Despite that during this period Latin America had undergone a process of 
independence from European colonisers, the reforms implemented by independent 
governments have not substantially reduced the high levels of inequality. Similarly, as 
mentioned earlier, Africa presented little changes in their income distribution for that period. 
Around the globe, there was a decrease of inequality comparing 1980 to 1820 and to 
1910. However, the Global South experienced the slowest decrease in inequality. This pattern 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lntea Lntea Lntea Lntea Lnestablished Lnestablished Lnestablished Lnestablished
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1820 -0.362** -0.436*** -0.541* -0.681*
(0.166) (0.165) (0.321) (0.371)
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1910 -0.477*** -0.742*
(0.175) (0.415)
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1980 -0.496** -0.586*
(0.236) (0.347)
Political stability -0.099 -0.096 -0.177 0.017 0.021 -0.058
(0.126) (0.127) (0.119) (0.109) (0.109) (0.120)
Control corruption 0.063 0.072 0.020 -0.050 -0.041 -0.098
(0.129) (0.130) (0.113) (0.161) (0.161) (0.146)
Number procedure start business 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.023 0.022 0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Access to credit 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GNI per capita 2000 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%Personally knows someone who started a 
business 2 years ago 1.501*** 1.394*** 1.408*** 1.413*** 0.757** 0.949** 0.962** 0.973**
(0.262) (0.358) (0.358) (0.359) (0.307) (0.406) (0.404) (0.424)
% Post-secondary education 0.239 0.691** 0.673** 0.693** 0.138 0.419 0.405 0.420
(0.237) (0.273) (0.272) (0.271) (0.228) (0.267) (0.265) (0.257)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 214 173 173 172 214 173 173 172
Number of countries 51 41 41 40 51 41 41 40
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might explain why Global South countries present an even stronger negative association 
between inequality in 1980 and the rate of percentage of people engaged in entrepreneurial 
activity at young and established firms than the one found for 1820 or 1910.10  
 
Table 6. Entrepreneurial activity during 2005-2011 and historical inequality for countries in 
Global South only, panel random effects 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our second robustness check aims at assessing the extent our measure of historical 
income inequality captures the inequalities in access to the credit market between the rich and 
the poor, which has been argued as the mechanism through which income inequality affects 
                                                             
10 For instance the Gini coefficient measure went down from 0.47 in 1820 to 0.41 in 1980 across all the 
sample analysed. During that period, the Gini coefficient also declined in the Global South, albeit only 
very slightly from 0.49 to 0.48.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lntea Lntea Lntea Lntea Lnestablished Lnestablished Lnestablished Lnestablished
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1820 -0.666*** -0.659** -1.436*** -1.751***
(0.244) (0.317) (0.433) (0.243)
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1910 -0.659** -1.751***
(0.317) (0.243)
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1980 -0.906*** -2.038***
(0.320) (0.289)
Political stability -0.194 -0.194 -0.256** -0.128 -0.128 -0.179
(0.122) (0.122) (0.106) (0.162) (0.162) (0.160)
Control corruption 0.029 0.029 0.026 -0.079 -0.079 -0.012
(0.116) (0.116) (0.103) (0.157) (0.157) (0.155)
Number procedure start business 0.019 0.019 0.018 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Access to credit -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
GNI per capita 2000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%Personally knows someone who started a 
business 2 years ago 1.081** 0.888 0.888 0.988* -0.849* -0.619 -0.619 -0.260
(0.445) (0.592) (0.592) (0.591) (0.489) (0.726) (0.726) (0.720)
% Post-secondary education 0.355 0.672* 0.672* 0.720* -0.038 0.301 0.301 0.441
(0.356) (0.404) (0.404) (0.390) (0.516) (0.547) (0.547) (0.535)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 113 81 81 80 113 81 81 80
Number of countries 33 24 24 23 33 24 24 23
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entrepreneurial activity over time. To the best of our knowledge, there are no historical 
estimators on access to credit by income groups across countries. There is scant evidence on 
this even for the latest decades. Thus, we use the recently released data on Financial Inclusion 
by the World Bank. This dataset shows the percentage of loans given in the previous year to 
the highest 60% income richest group and the bottom 40% income poorest group. This 
information is only available for 49 of the countries for which we also have historical indicators 
of income distribution, and unfortunately only have information for 2011 (the last year for 
which the GEM survey is publically accessible). Bearing in mind these limitations, in Table 7, 
we show that on average, roughly the same percentage of rich and poor people received a loan 
in the previous year, but with important differences across countries. 
Table 7. Summary statistics on financial inclusion for 2011 
 
 
Moreover, Figure 3 shows a positive relationship between the ratio of loans given to 
the richest and poorest income groups for 2011 and the ratio of top 9th decile to bottom decile 
for 1820. This association suggests that the more unequal countries were in the distant past, the 




Figure 3. 2011 Ratio of loans given during previous year to richest 60% to poorest 40% and ratio of 
the income share top 9 decile to the bottom decile for year 1820 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loan in the past year 49 31.11 11.37 13.39 71.06
Loan in the past year, income, richest 60% 49 31.22 12.10 14.22 71.23





To test whether these current indicators of access to credit have any impact on 
entrepreneurial activity in Table 8, we re-ran our analysis including in columns (1) and (3) the 
percentage of richest 60% and poorest 40% that got a loan in the previous year. As expected, 
there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the entrepreneurial activity 
(for young and established firms) and the percentage of poor people that have loans in the 
previous year. That is, a less credit constrained poor population produces a higher percentage 
of young and established firms. In contrast, there is a negative relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and the credit given to the richest 60%. Since the theoretical predictions 
of the different access to credit on firms’ development refer to the ratio of people that are credit 
and not credit constrained, column (2) and (4) instead use the log of the ratio of the loan given 
to the richest 60% to poorest 40%. The coefficient of this ratio reveals, once again as expected, 
a negative association between entrepreneurial activity and the ratio of loans given to the 
wealthy to the poor, just as we have found before for the various historical measures of 
inequality. However, this relationship is statistically significant only for the log of young 
businesses and not for established ones. This suggests that higher levels of financial inclusion, 
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meaning a higher proportion of loans given to the poorest groups, would be beneficial for 
entrepreneurial activity, particularly for creating new firms. However, other policies will be 
needed for the poorest groups to be able to have their businesses mature, such as broader access 
to credit for firms to be able to survive. 
 
Table 8. Entrepreneurial activity during 2005-2011 and alternative access to credit measures, 
panel random effects 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.1 Instrumental variables: Determinants of current institutions  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lntea Lntea Lnestablished Lnestablished
Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1820 -0.311** -0.296* -0.655** -0.573*
(0.144) (0.156) (0.288) (0.328)
Political stability -0.171** -0.169** -0.120 -0.122
(0.080) (0.083) (0.105) (0.106)
Control corruption 0.057 0.090 -0.011 0.057
(0.082) (0.094) (0.141) (0.141)
Number procedure start business 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.018
(0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019)
GNI per capita 2000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%Personally knows someone who started 
a business 2 years ago 1.683*** 1.786*** 0.883* 1.080**
(0.314) (0.324) (0.496) (0.515)
% Post-secondary education 0.522** 0.546** 0.097 0.118
(0.245) (0.245) (0.302) (0.300)
Loan in the past year richest 60% -0.019** -0.022*
(0.008) (0.012)
Loan in the past year poorest 40% 0.026*** 0.042***
(0.009) (0.014)
ln ratio of loan richest to poorest -0.507* -0.598
(0.261) (0.401)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 196 196 196 196
Number of countries 47 47 47 47
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The great majority of previous empirical studies similar to ours have not tested for the potential 
endogenous relationship between entrepreneurial activity and institutional variables.11 Thus, 
based on previous empirical literature, we have a priori no certainty on whether our results 
presented thus far could be biased. As our third and last robustness check, we test for 
endogeneity between entrepreneurial activity and our institutional variables in a two-stage 
process. In the first stage, we estimate the relationship between current credit and institutions, 
the potential endogenous covariates so far used, and external instruments as shown in eq. (2). 
External instrument Zi denotes a set of dummy variables indicating the former coloniser, 
whether Spain, Great Britain or France, and instruments frequently used in the literature (La 
Porta, 1998, 1999). In addition, we use the European settler mortality rate during the colonizer 
era, used by Acemoglu et al. (2001). These instruments are likely good candidates to measure 
how inclusive the institutions have been over time influencing political stability, control of 
corruption and entrepreneurial environment. Zit denotes the external instruments that vary over 
time within countries. Among these, we include the number of journalists killed by country12 
and year from 2005–2011 given that previous studies have found the degree of freedom of 
media is strongly correlated with control of corruption and with political stability (Besley and 
Burgess, 2001; Besley and Prat, 2006; Chowdhury, 2004). We also consider the fixed 
telephone subscriptions per 100 people as previous studies have found it associated with 
financial inclusion (Beck et al., 2007). In addition, we use the average systolic blood pressure 
by country and year, as according to recent literature, people who find it hard to gain access to 
credit can experience physiological responses to stress. For instance, people experiencing 
                                                             
11 An exception is found in Ardanga and Lusardi (2008), in which business regulations are instrumented 
with the countries’ legal origin to assess endogeneity between entrepreneurship and credit regulation. 
In that study, as to some extent ours, find no evidence of endogeneity. 
12 Data obtained from CPJ (2017). 
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financial distress are less likely to follow recommended health maintenance practices such as 
eating a healthy diet, thus elevating blood pressure and risk of cardiovascular diseases and 
cholesterol (O’Neil et al., 2005). Since cardiovascular diseases, high blood pressure and 
cholesterol are associated with economic development, they vary across countries, making 
them ideal instruments since institutions and credit vary across countries (Ezzati et al., 2005). 
institutionit=α+ γ1Historical inequality+γ2xit+ γ3 Xi +γ 4Zi + γ 5Zit+γ 6 Regioni+γ 7Yeart + vi+ ηit                
                                                                                                                                                 (2)     
Table A.5 in Appendix shows the results of the first-stage regressions for each of the 
four instrumented institutional variables: political stability, control of corruption, the number 
of procedures to start a new business and access to credit.  
Table A.6 then presents the results of the instrumental variable (IV)-second stage least 
squares of the regression shown in eq. (3). There, we also include the Anderson-Rubin Wald 
Join test of all instruments, which confirms that the instruments are jointly correlated with the 
endogenous variable and are valid instruments. The Sargan statistics suggest the instruments 
are valid, that is uncorrelated with the error term, and the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the main panel random effects (Baum, 2006).  
 
   yit=α+1Historicalinequality+2xit+3Xi+4Regioni+5Yeart+6ଓ݊ݐݏଓݐݑݐଓݏ݊݋ෟ +ui+it       (3)                              
 
The endogeneity test confirms the presence of endogeneity when considering the 
current institutions for young business but not for the established firms. Despite the mixed 
evidence of the endogeneity test, the second-stage regressions suggest that current institutions 
have no impact on the proportion of people involved in entrepreneurial activity, as shown in 
the previous results. Moreover, these IV regressions confirm the hypothesis that inequality is 
negatively associated with entrepreneurial activity. A higher ratio of wealthy to poor people in 
34 
 
1820 produces a lower proportion of people engaged in young or established firms during 
2005–2011 (Table A.5, columns 1 and 2).13  
Given that none of the instrumented current institutions turned statistically significant, 
and the mixed evidence of the presence of endogeneity, our preferred estimates remain the 




The aim of this article was to empirically test whether income inequality has any long-term 
effect on entrepreneurship, thereby affecting development over time. To this end, we used a 
panel of 66 countries from 2005–2011 using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
survey. We triangulated this survey with current institutional indicators, access to financial 
markets and with the estimates of income distribution around the globe from the 19th to 20th 
century provided by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002).  
We draw two main conclusions from our results. First, high levels of historical 
inequality in the long-run are associated with a high percentage of people reporting opening 
                                                             
13 We re-ran all our IV regressions using the different historical inequality measures so far presented 
showing very similar results, but for simplification purposes, we only present those for 1820 and the 
ratio of the 9 decile to the bottom decile. We also tried other combinations of instruments, such as the 
percentage of the population with access to mobile, internet, the percentage of media owned by the 
state, and the legal origin of counties’ legal code. All these instruments resulted in similar results but 
turned out to be weaker than the instruments thus far presented. We also tried to instrument only one 
institutional variable at a time, whilst leaving the rest out of the regression resulting once again in similar 
results. There is a negative association between historical inequality and entrepreneurial activity and no 
evidence that the current institutional environment affects much the creation and maturity of firms.  
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business out of need. This result is fully compatible with the empirical observation that regions 
that today are highly unequal, such as Latin America, also have high levels of early-stage 
businesses and informal economy. Second, since these young businesses are unlikely to 
survive in the short run, we find that income inequality prevailing in the distant past has overall 
a negative effect on the creation and survival of businesses over time. These results are 
consistent regardless of the different measures of inequality (whether the Gini index or 
different ratios of income share) for different years (1820, 1910 or 1980), whether removing 
regions that are highly unequal from the analysis, or focusing only on the Global South. The 
results are also robust if using instrumental variables to deal for the potential endogeneity 
between the institutional variables used and the entrepreneurial activity assessed.  
Our results then give support to the theoretical literature that suggests that if the early 
wealth/income distribution is such that a large percentage of the population is credit 
constrained, then fewer businesses will be created and survive over time (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Ghatak and Jiang, 2002). Moreover, our findings might help reconcile the 
mixed evidence of previous studies that suggest high levels of inequality increase early 
entrepreneurial activity (Lippman et al., 2005; Naudé, 2010) as well as that of Halter et al. 
(2014) who find inequality helps economic performance in the short term, but has an overall 
negative effect in the long term. Our findings also support recent articles concerned about the 
damaging effects that inequality has in the long-run, particularly given the rise of inequality in 
developed countries seen over the last four decades (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Piketty, 2015; 
Stiglitz, 2012; 2015). 
Our results have important policy implications. Our findings suggest economic 
convergence across countries is unlikely to occur since countries are predisposed to their initial 
conditions for their businesses to thrive and in others to struggle. Thus, to foster the creation 
of businesses, policies should focus on addressing long-standing differences in wealth within 
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countries as well as fostering financial inclusion among the poor. Incidentally, these policies 
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Table A.1. List of countries and country groups for which Bourgignon and Morrison (2002) 

















Table A.2. List of countries analysed in GEM and years sampled 
Africa
Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, North Africa, South Africa and 46 other grouped African countries
Asia
China, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines and 45 other grouped Asian countries
Japan, Korea, Taiwan
Japan, Korea and Taiwan
Latin America
Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and 37 other grouped Latin American countries
Easter Europe
Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland, Russia and Turkey
Western Europe and European offshoots
Argentina, Chile, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, France, Germany, Italy
Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Benelux, and microstates, 














Table A.3. Data description and sources 
Country Years Country Years
Algeria 2009 Malaysia 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011
Algeria 2011 Mexico 2005-2011
Argentina 2005-2011 Morocco 2009
Australia 2005-2011 Netherlands 2005-2011
Austria 2005, 2006 New Zealand 2005
Bangladesh 2011 Nigeria 2011
Belgium 2005-2011 Norway 2005-2011
Bolivia 2008, 2009 Pakistan 2010-2011
Brazil 2005-2011 Panama 2009, 2011
Canada 2005, 2006 Peru 2006-2011
Chile 2005-2011 Philippines 2006
China 2005-2011 Poland 2011
Colombia 2006-2011 Portugal 2007, 2010, 2011
Croatia 2005-2011 Romania 2007-2011
Czech Republic 2006, 2011 Russia 2006-2011
Denmark 2005-2011 Singapore 2005, 2006, 2011
Dominican Republic 2007, 2008, 2009 Slovakia 2011
Ecuador 2008, 2009, 2010 Slovenia 2005-2011
Egypt 2008, 2010 South Africa 2005-2011
Finland 2005-2011 South Korea 2008-2011
France 2005-2011 Spain 2005-2011
Germany 2005-2011 Sweden 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011
Ghana 2010 Switzerland 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011
Greece 2005-2011 Taiwan 2010, 2011
Guatemala 2009, 2010, 2011 Thailand 2005, 2006, 2007, 2011
Hong Kong 2007, 2009 Trinidad and Tobago 2010, 2011
Hungary 2005-2011 Tunisia 2009, 2010
Iceland 2005-2011 Turkey 2006-2011
India 2006, 2007, 2008 Uganda 2009, 2010
Indonesia 2006 United Kingdom 2005-2011
Ireland 2005-2011 United States 2005-2011
Italy 2005-2010 Uruguay 2006-2011
















Data descriptions and sources Description Source
% Young firms (TEA) Percentage of adults aged 18 and over setting up a business or owning-managing a young firm (up to 3.5 
years old) including self-employment (Reynolds et al., 2005).
GEM 2005 to 2011
%Established firms Percentage of adults aged 18 and over that owns and manages an established firm (older than 3.5 years 
old) including self-employment (Reynolds et al., 2005).
GEM 2005 to 2011
%Personally knows someone who started a 
business 2 years ago
Percentage of individuals who know someone personally who started a business in the past years 
(Reynolds et al., 2005).
GEM 2005 to 2011
% Have post-secondary education Percentage of individuals who have post-secondary or higher education. GEM 2005 to 2011
Political stability
Political stability and absence of violence estimates the probability that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence 
and terrorism. Ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). (Kaufmann et al., 2010)
WGI 2005-2011
Control of corruption
Control of corruption estimates perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, and capture of the estate by elites and private 
interests. This variable rantes between -2.5 to 2.5 with higher outcomes corresponding to better 
outcomes of institutions (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
WGI 2005-2011
Number of procedures starting a business
Number of procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an 
industrial or commercial business and the duration of these procedures.
World Bank Doing Business, 
2005-2011
Access to credit
Domestic credit indicator provided by the banking sector which include all credit to various sectors as 
percentage of GDP.
World Bank 2001-2011
GNI per capita in 2000 Gross National Income per capita in 2000. World Bank 2000
Income share for years 1700 , 1810,  1910, 1980
Estimates of income shares by decile for years 1700, 1810, 1910, also used to estimate Gini coefficients for 
these years.
Bourguignon and Morrisson 
(2002) and Morrisson and 
Murtin (2011) 
Journalist killed Number of journalist killed by country. CPJ 2005-2011
Blood pressure male Systolic blood pressure of men (mm Hg) age standardized mean. WHO 2005-2011
Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people)
Fixed telephone subscriptions refers to the sum of active number of analogue fixed telephone lines, voice-
over-IP (VoIP) subscriptions, fixed wireless local loop (WLL) subscriptions, ISDN voice-channel equivalents 
and fixed public payphones.
World Bank 2001-2011
European settler mortality 
Mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed in the colonies between the seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries, largely based on the work of Philip D. Curtin, used by Acemoglu et al., (2001) as 
instrument of mortality rates faced by settlers.
Acemoglu et al., (2001)
Colonial dummy Dummy indicated whether country was a British, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Belgian, Dutch or 
Portuguese colony.
La Porta et al., 1999
Loan in the past year
Denotes the percentage of respondents who borrowed any money in the past 12 months from any of the 
following sources: a formal financial institution, a store by using instalment credit, family or friends, 
employer, or another private lender (% age 15+). Available only for 2011.
World Bank 2011
Loan in the past year, income, richest 60% 
Denotes the percentage of respondents who borrowed any money in the past 12 months from any of the 
following sources: a formal financial institution, a store by using instalment credit, family or friends, 
employer, or another private lender (income, richest 60%, % age 15+). Available only for 2011.
World Bank 2011
Loan in the past year, income, poorest 40% 
Denotes the percentage of respondents who borrowed any money in the past 12 months from any of the 
following sources: a formal financial institution, a store by using instalment credit, family or friends, 




Table A.4. Entrepreneurial activity during 2005-2011 and alternative historical inequality 
measure, panel random effects 
 











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lntea Lntea Lnestablished Lnestablished
Ln ratio top 4 deciles to bottom 4 deciles year 1820 -0.442** -0.958**
(0.203) (0.394)
Ln Gini 1820 -1.307*** -2.366***
(0.490) (0.899)
Political stability -0.153* -0.149* -0.055 -0.047
(0.090) (0.087) (0.110) (0.107)
Control corruption 0.034 0.022 -0.053 -0.059
(0.081) (0.077) (0.140) (0.142)
Number procedure start business 0.009 0.008 0.018 0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018)
Access to credit 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GNI per capita 2000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%Personally knows someone who started a 
business 2 years ago 1.501*** 1.475*** 0.771** 0.754*
(0.300) (0.301) (0.384) (0.393)
% Post-secondary education 0.506** 0.524** 0.170 0.194
(0.237) (0.237) (0.262) (0.262)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 217 217 217 217
Number of countries 52 52 52 52
48 
 
Table A.5. Entrepreneurial activity, first stage of instrumental variable regressions with panel 
random effects 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Instrumented variables: political stability, control corruption, number procedures start business, 
access to credit. Excluded instruments: Journalists killed, blood pressure, fixed telephone 
subscriptions, European settler mortality, whether former colonies, interaction between blood pressure 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)




















Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1820 0.26 -0.255 -6.606** 47.897* 0.26 -0.255 -6.606*** 47.897*
(0.512) (0.393) (2.349) (27.387) (0.512) (0.393) (2.349) (27.387)
%Personally knows someone who started a 
business 2 years ago 1.733 0.644 -3.461 -114.394* 1.733 0.644 -3.461 -114.394*
(1.206) (0.925) (5.53) (64.477) (1.206) (0.925) (5.53) (64.477)
GNI per capita 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
% Post-secondary education 0.613 -0.425 -7.413 92.322 0.613 -0.425 -7.413 92.322
(1.113) (0.854) (5.104) (59.507) (1.113) (0.854) (5.104) (59.507)
Journalist killed CPJ 10.587 9.187 -51.408 440.062 10.587 9.187 -51.408 440.062
(9.264) (7.104) (42.476) (495.201) (9.264) (7.104) (42.476) (495.201)
Blood pressure male 0.114*** 0.077** -0.194 6.919*** 0.114*** 0.077** -0.194 6.919***
(0.036) (0.027) (0.163) (1.905) (0.036) (0.027) (0.163) (1.905)
Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people) 0.054** 0.06*** -0.023 -2.226* 0.054** 0.06*** -0.023 -2.226*
(0.024) (0.018) (0.109) (1.266) (0.024) (0.018) (0.109) (1.266)
European settler mortality Acemoglu et al. 0.001 0.00 -0.002 -0.196** 0.001 0.00 -0.002 -0.196**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.062) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.062)
Colonies (never colonized by Western oversea reference)
Spanish Colony -17.163*** -10.449** 45.002* -784.55*** -17.163*** -10.449** 45.002* -784.55***
(5.323) (4.082) (24.409) (284.576) (5.323) (4.082) (24.409) (284.576)
British Colony -17.159** -10.341** 51.266** -799.682*** -17.159*** -10.341** 51.266** -799.682***
(5.456) (4.184) (25.017) (291.664) (5.456) (4.184) (25.017) (291.664)
French Colony -17.459** -10.584** 52.226** -863.197*** -17.459*** -10.584** 52.226** -863.197***
(5.391) (4.134) (24.717) (288.161) (5.391) (4.134) (24.717) (288.161)
Blood pressure*Journalists killed CPJ -0.086 -0.073 0.402 -3.428 -0.086 -0.073 0.402 -3.428
(0.073) (0.056) (0.333) (3.878) (0.073) (0.056) (0.333) (3.878)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67




Table A.6. Entrepreneurial activity, second stage of instrumental variable regressions with 
panel random effects 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Instrumented variables: political stability, control corruption, number procedures start business, 
access to credit. Excluded instruments: Journalists killed, blood pressure, fixed telephone 
subscriptions, European settler mortality, whether former colonies, interaction between blood pressure 




Ln ratio 9 to 1 income share for year 1820 -1.439* -2.404***
(0.765) (0.767)
Political stability 0.224 -0.113
(0.612) (0.614)
Control corruption -1.020 -0.462
(0.772) (0.775)
Number procedure start business -0.112 -0.181
(0.0953) (0.1156)
Access to credit -0.00326 -0.00677
(0.00417) (0.00418)
GNI per capita 2000 3.76e-05 -4.68e-05
(4.29e-05) (4.30e-05)
%Personally knows someone who started a 
business 2 years ago -0.226 -2.766*
(1.510) (1.515)
% Post-secondary education -0.960 -0.279
(1.339) (1.343)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 67 67
Number of countries 21 21
Anderson-Rubin Wald Joint test 91.16*** 52.739***
Sargan statistic 4.021 3.394
Endogeneity test Chi2 22.74* 5.00
